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Plimsoll — a sandbox daemon for agent-written code that states how strong the wall was, and refuses to run below a floor you set
Plimsoll (Apache-2.0, Go, 22 stars, v0.21.0 on Friday, Show HN Sunday) is a daemon you run yourself that executes untrusted code, typically code an agent just wrote, and labels every result with the isolation tier it actually got: process, container, kernel or vm. The backend is configuration: WebAssembly or plain Docker on a laptop, Docker under gVisor or E2B and Docker Cloud microVMs in production, with the client code unchanged. A request can set MinimumIsolation; if the daemon can't meet it, the call fails with ErrInsufficientIsolation and nothing runs, so code that needs a VM can't quietly run on your test setup. Clients exist for Go, Python (Agno, CrewAI, Google ADK) and TypeScript (Vercel AI SDK, Trigger.dev, Mastra); go run ./examples/minimal tries it at the process tier.
The second half is credentials. Sandboxed code has no network by default. To call one of your APIs it goes through a broker outside the sandbox that checks the exact route the run was granted, attaches a token minted for that run, and enforces call and size budgets. The token never enters the sandbox. Every response carries SHA-256 hashes of request and result that the clients recompute, and a separate plimsoll-attest signs session chains and refuses one with a call missing. Each caller gets a daily allowance of paid microVM seconds, because, as the author puts it, "agents never get bored." In the thread, asked how it compares to remote sandboxes like exe.dev, the author drew the line: Plimsoll runs code for agents and MCP servers, not the agents themselves.
Reach for it if your product runs code a model wrote and you want the boundary and the API credential to be facts on the result, not a sentence in the docs. Delete the subprocess.run with an API key in its environment. Tradeoffs: pre-1.0, one contributor, and by the author's own account no other users and no outside security audit; gVisor is Linux-only, so a Mac tops out at the container tier; and the tier label comes from configuration plus startup checks, not hardware attestation.