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agent-vault — the agent uses your credentials without ever holding them
An open-source credential proxy from Infisical (the secrets-management company) that sits between your agent and the internet. Agents route outbound traffic through it via HTTPS_PROXY; their config holds only dummy placeholders like __anthropic_api_key__, and the proxy substitutes the real credential into the request on the way out. A prompt injection can make the agent do plenty of stupid things, but it cannot exfiltrate a secret the agent never possessed. You also get egress filtering and a request log — which endpoints your agent actually called, with which identity. Ships as a single binary for macOS/Linux (one curl install) or Docker, SQLite by default, Postgres for production, management UI included. 1,820 stars since March, pushed yesterday.
This is the credential version of a pattern we keep seeing: enforcement at the layer the agent can't talk its way around, not advice in a prompt. It's designed to run on a separate machine from the agents precisely because the agents are the untrusted parties. Reach for it the moment agents run anywhere you aren't watching — remote boxes, sandboxes, overnight jobs. Delete the .env full of live keys you've been copying into every agent sandbox. Tradeoffs: it's a man-in-the-middle proxy, so it terminates TLS and you're trusting its CA and its box with everything; and the license is MIT except an ee directory of paid enterprise features — read the boundary before you build on it.